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The Shape of Things to Come: 
Institutions, Entrepreneurs, and the Case of Hedge Funds 
Abstract 
Foundational work on institutional theory as a framework for studying organizations 
underscored its relevance to analyses of entrepreneurship, but entrepreneurship research has 
often ignored the insights provided by this theoretic approach. In this chapter, we illustrate the 
utility of institutional theory as a central framework for explaining entrepreneurial phenomena by 
discussing three primary questions for entrepreneurship researchers: Under what conditions are 
individuals likely to found new organizations? What are key influences on the kinds of 
organizations they found? And what factors determine the likelihood of the survival of new 
organizations? We describe the kinds of answers that an institutional perspective provides to 
these questions, illustrate some of our arguments by drawing on a recent field of entrepreneurial 
endeavor, hedge funds, and discuss the implications of our analysis for further work by 
entrepreneurship researchers. 
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As others in this volume have noted, the relevance of institutional theory to understanding 
entrepreneurial phenomena seems, at least at first blush, moot. Resting on a fundamental 
sociological premise, that individuals’ decisions and actions are strongly constrained by social 
norms and commonly-held behavioral expectations (Durkheim, 1938), an institutional 
perspective contrasts sharply with the classic economic perspective that underpins a significant 
amount of extant work on entrepreneurship, one that treats individuals’ decisions and actions as 
the result of independently conducted calculations of costs and benefits (von Hayek, 1939; von 
Mises, 1936). The apparent disjuncture between institutional theory and entrepreneurship 
research has been reinforced by the fact that the bulk of empirical research carried out under the 
banner of institutional theory has focused on the way in which norms and expectations affect the 
diffusion of structures and practices across established organizations, and given little attention to 
their effects on the generation of new organizations and areas of economic activity, the central 
concern of entrepreneurship research (Tolbert, David and Sine, 2010). 
Although this evidence seems to suggest a clear disconnect between these literatures, it is 
notable that early work on contemporary institutional theory by Meyer and Rowan explicitly 
identified entrepreneurship as an area of study for which this perspective was relevant. As they 
observed (1977: 345), 
The growth of rationalized institut ional structures in society makes formal 
organizations…both easier to create and more necessary. After all, the building blocks for 
organizations come to be littered around the societal landscape; it takes only a little 
entrepreneurial energy to assemble them into a structure. And because these building 
blocks are considered proper, adequate, rational and necessary, organizations must 
incorporate them to avoid illegitimacy. 
Our aim in this chapter is to amplify these claims, by illuminating how a variety of 
questions of interest to entrepreneurship researchers are usefully addressed through an 
institutional perspective, and identifying some of the major questions for further research that 
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this theoretic application suggests need to be addressed. We organize our discussion around three 
issues that we see as central to the field of entrepreneurship studies, viz.: Under what conditions 
are individuals likely to found new organizations? What are key influences on the kinds of 
organizations they found? And what factors determine the likelihood of the survival of new 
organizations? We begin by offering a general theoretical analysis of the kinds of answers 
institutional theory suggests to these questions, then discuss the relatively new entrepreneurial 
area of hedge funds as a case to illustrate and provide anecdotal support for our claims of the 
utility of institutional theory as a framework for studying new ventures. In concluding, we 
identify a number of key lines of research that are suggested by our arguments. 
Scope Conditions: The Definition of Entrepreneurship 
Having taken a strong stand on the importance of institutional theory for entrepreneurship 
research, we now need to backpedal a little, and acknowledge that this importance depends partly 
on how one defines the domain of the latter. Work on entrepreneurship offers a vast soup of 
definitions of its central construct. Aldrich and Ruef (2006) note at least four broad definitional 
approaches, ranging from ones that draw on Schumpeter’s (1934) concept of creative destruction 
to set the parameters of “entrepreneurship” (effectively reserving the term for only a very small 
subset of new ventures, ones that result in the replacement of existing markets with new ones), to 
those that award the label exclusively to new ventures that have the core objective of rapid 
growth, and that require high capitalization for success (thus suggesting contemporary high 
technology companies as the appropriate objects of study for entrepreneurship scholars), to those 
that reflect a big-tent orientation, including all efforts to establish new, independent 
organizations (with, perhaps, the exception of foundings that represent new units of existing 
firms or the government). 
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For work that emphasizes the creation of new markets as a defining attribute of 
entrepreneurship, the utility of an institutional perspective may be more limited, at least in terms 
of explaining foundings. (We think that it’s very relevant to explaining the structure of new firms 
and their survival, however, even within the restricted framework of this approach.) In our view, 
institutional theory is not a useful framework for explaining when deviance from established 
patterns is likely to occur or why. Thus, we agree with Aldrich’s assertion (see Chapter x in this 
volume), that institutional theory is unlikely to provide useful insights for explaining the 
occurrence of “black swans,” and that other perspectives, such as social psychological studies of 
creativity (e.g., Goncalo and Staw, 2006) may be much more relevant to such problems. 
Institutional theory cannot provide a comprehensive framework for studying entrepreneurial 
phenomena – but we do not believe that any single theoretical framework can fulfill that charge. 
However, although many, if not most scholars pay some homage to the Schumpeterian 
view of entrepreneurship, it’s not clear this definition dominates the field. Indeed, a substantial 
body of work in this area is devoted simply to understanding factors that affect founding rates of 
new organizations (e.g., Aldrich, 1990; Aronson, 1991; Mezias and Kuperman, 2001; Shane, 
1996), regardless of the novelty of their form, suggesting that a broader definition of 
entrepreneurship is often favored in practice. And an institutional theory is, we argue, highly 
relevant to explaining foundings when broader definitions are employed. 
Founding Organizations: Entrepreneurship as an Institution 
In its initial formulation, institut ional theory was offered as a way of explaining commonly-
observed patterns of structural homogeneity that characterized sets of organizations (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), an explanation that contrasted with 
then-dominant theoretical frameworks by emphasizing cultural demands instead of efficiency 
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demands (Dacin, 1997; Scott, 1987). There were two central premises on which this explanation 
rested. The first was that elements of formal structure – departments, offices, job titles, po licies, 
etc. – can come to be commonly accepted (i.e., institutionalized) as necessary parts of efficient 
and effective organizations. Whether such elements objectively enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness is, in this theoretical formulation, immaterial. Indeed, Meyer and Rowan’s 
discussion of decoupling suggested that institutionalized structures often are inefficient, 
something organizational decision-makers recognize, though they adopt them anyway.1 This 
brings us to the second key premise, viz., once structures become institutionalized, organizations 
adopt them because they are understood to be necessary elements of well-run organizations 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Thus, institut ional the ory suggests that formal organizational 
structure reflects, at least in part, cultural prescriptions about how to organize (Scott, 2004). 
We argue that the sorts of cultural prescriptions highlighted by institutional theory not only 
affect the structural form of organizations (including those taken by new ventures, as discussed 
below) but also are a key determinant of individuals’ propensity to found new organizations. In 
this context, institutional theory provides a useful framework for addressing one of the key 
questions studied by entrepreneurship researchers: What factors determine variations in rates of 
new organization founding? Research on differences in entrepreneurial proclivities across ethnic 
groups and variations in founding rates across geographic areas provides strong support for the 
claims that entrepreneurship can be treated as an institution in its own right, and that variability 
in the presence and strength of this institution is key to explaining patterns of new organization 
formation (Tolbert, David and Sine, 2010). 
Research has shown that immigrants to the United States often have significantly higher 
rates of entrepreneurship than non-immigrants (Collins and More 1970; Borjas, 1986), a finding 
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that is often explained in terms of immigrants’ blocked opportunities for employment and 
mobility within existing organizations due to discrimination and prejudice (Bonacich, 1973). 
However, research also highlights notable variation among immigrant groups (e.g., Light and 
Rosenstein, 1995; Zhou, 2004), both in their overall propensity to found new business 
organizations and in the specific kinds of business that they are inclined to create. According to 
Zhou (2004), groups with above-average propensity to found new businesses include Japanese, 
Koreans, Chinese, Iranians and Cubans; by comparison, Mexican and Filipino immigrants are 
much less likely to start their own businesses. This sort of between-groups variation provides a 
general indication that entry into entrepreneurship is driven by more than just blocked 
opportunities; it suggests the critical effects of cultural differences among ethnic groups – social 
understandings that make founding a new firm a more readily grasped option. It is these sorts of 
understandings that constitute entrepreneurship as an institution. 
Work on cross-national and regional variations in founding rates suggests geographic as 
well as ethnic boundaries to the institution of entrepreneurship. A good example is provided in a 
study by Saxenian (1994), exploring two areas in which computer companies were established 
early in the industry’s development, Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in 
Massachusetts, and focusing on differences between these areas in terms of the subsequent 
founding of other new companies. Despite seemingly similar resources and opportunities in the 
two locations in the early 1980s, Route 128 proved to have limited incubation capacity for new 
firms in the industry, while Silicon Valley spawned hundreds and hundreds of new firms. 
Entrepreneurship became institutionalized in the California region, but not in Massachusetts. In 
her comparison of these two cases, Saxenian identifies some of the historical and emergent 
forces importantly implicated in this institutionalization process, including differences between 
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key universities in the two regions in their openness to relations with commercial enterprises, the 
relative willingness of West and East Coast law firms to play financial brokering roles, variations 
in patterns and rates of personnel flows across firms, and so forth. 
These and other sources of the institutionalization of entrepreneurship have been further 
explored in more recent work on regional clusters of new firm foundings (e.g., Khessina and 
Carroll, 2008; Romanelli and Khessina, 2005; Sine and Lee, 2009; Sorenson and Audia, 2000). 
Like the work on ethnic entrepreneurs, this work underscores the key role of shared, cultural 
understandings of entrepreneurship as an important influence on individuals’ decisions to create 
new businesses (Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009). 
Dimensions of the Institution of Entrepreneurship 
The juxtaposition of these two streams of literature suggests two main dimensions of 
entrepreneurship as an institution: normative acceptance of self-employment as a viable, even 
desirable career option; and shared information and cognitions about the processes involved in 
starting and running new organizations – tacit, recipe-knowledge that is difficult (if not 
impossible) to formalize. As we discuss below in our analysis of the case of hedge fund 
organizations, the latter dimension – specifically, the existence a nucleus (or nuclei) of key actors 
who create and disseminate knowledge about setting up and running new firms – is likely to be 
particularly important in increasing rates of founding in emerging industries and markets. In 
these circumstances, potential founders face especially high levels of uncertainty in terms of 
choosing viable technologies, effective marketing strategies, appropriate standards for selecting 
qualified personnel, and so forth. Without accessible, credible sources of information to assist in 
making these choices, would-be entrepreneurs are likely to find the decision-making processes of 
setting up an enterprise to be overwhelming (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), and the perceived riskiness 
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to be untenable (Sine, Haveman and Tolbert, 2005). As noted by a range of theorists, 
institutional prescriptions not only constrain but also enable action, by limiting the number of 
choices individuals have to make (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1976; Sewell, 1992; 
Simon, 1947). In new markets, where relevant prescriptions are not widely diffused, the presence 
of a few key actors who provide such information can strongly shape the propensity of nascent 
entrepreneurs, in Aldrich and Ruef’s (2006) terms, to become active entrepreneurs (see Hiatt, 
2010). 
Although the informational dimension of the institution of entrepreneurship may be 
especially important for understanding variations in founding rates in new economic sectors, it is 
also likely to be relevant to understanding variations in the types of organizations that different 
ethnic groups are apt to found. That is, as members of an ethnic group gain and share knowledge 
about founding and operating a particular kind of enterprise (e.g., restaurants, small groceries, 
garment manufacturing, etc.), this affects the propensity of other group members to found similar 
enterprises (Dowell and David, 2007). 
The normative dimension has been given less explicit attention in existing work, but 
studies of ethnic entrepreneurship, in particular, suggest its importance. Thus, for example, 
Goldscheider (1986) makes a case that the relatively high rates of entrepreneurial activity among 
Jews in the U.S. reflects a shared value of occupational independence, a value fostered and 
reinforced by anti-Semitic discrimination in Europe. Similarly, Raijman and Tienda’s 
comparative study of ethnic entrepreneurs (2000) indicates that while founding and operating a 
small business is considered an acceptable career choice for first generation Korean immigrants, 
subsequent generations are expected to find other career opportunities with greater mobility; in 
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contrast, Hispanics have a more favorable view of continuing a family-founded business as an 
intergenerational career strategy. 
Research on regional variations in firm foundings can also be interpreted as suggesting 
geographic variation in the normative dimension of the institution of entrepreneurship. 
Saxenian’s (1994) work on regional variations in the founding rates of firms in the computer 
industry strongly suggests that the concatenation of material circumstances supporting 
entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley probably reflected, in part, the existence of greater normative 
acceptance in California for starting one’s own company, compared to Massachusetts. In line 
with this, Sine and Lee’s (2009) analysis of the creation of new wind power enterprises showed 
that California had a much higher rate of founding in the industry’s early years than Texas, 
despite the greater presence of key resources (wind) in the latter state. They attribute this to the 
higher levels of activity by environmental movement organizations in California, which aimed at 
encouraging would-be entrepreneurs to enter the industry, but it is possible that such variation 
also partly reflected geographic variations in the acceptability of entrepreneurship as a career 
option. 
Of course, the normative and informational aspects of institutionalized entrepreneurship are 
likely to co-vary, since the existence of cognitive templates about how to create and operate new 
organizations that are shared across sets of individuals makes entrepreneurship easier to support 
as a viable career choice, and normative support for the pursuit of entrepreneurial efforts fosters 
efforts to create and pass along such templates. More specific evidence of the existence and 
nature of these templates comes from research on sources of new ventures’ formal structure. 
Designing Organizations: Institutional Sources of Structure 
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The fit between an organization’s formal structure and specific conditions confronting it 
(technological demands, environmental predictability, number of organizational members, etc.), 
and the consequences of such fit for organizational prosperity and survival have been key foci of 
traditional studies of organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Weber, 1947; Woodward, 1958). 
However, with few exceptions, surprisingly little research on entrepreneurship has focused on 
the determinants of the formal structure of new organizations or its consequences. 
Yet there is evidence that, as in established organizations, variations in formal structure are 
likely to be highly consequential for the fate of new ventures. For example, Sine, Kirsh and 
Mitushashi (2006) showed that the survival chances of new ventures providing internet service 
were significantly enhanced when they had relatively high levels of structural formalization, 
specialization and administrative intensity, and that formalization was particularly important for 
organizations with larger founding teams. These findings are consistent both with extant 
arguments about the particular importance of reliability to the survival of new organizations, and 
with traditional work linking structural arrangements to greater organizational reliability. 
Ecologists and others (see Stinchcombe, 1965) have posited that demonstrating reliability is of 
critical importance for new firms, because such firms typically lack established reputations and 
trust with customers and suppliers (Zucker, 1983); problems of reliability are used to explain 
increased chances of failure associated with fundamental reorganizations of older firms, as well 
as the comparatively high rates of failure among newly-founded firms. In this context, classic 
organizational studies showing that higher levels of bureaucratization are often the key to 
achieving reliability and stability in performance (see Tolbert and Hall, 2009) are clearly relevant 
to entrepreneurship studies. Along similar lines, other studies have indicated that the formal 
structure of new firms has important effects on a variety of performance-related outcomes, 
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including management turnover and likelihood of going public (Baron, Hannan and Burton, 
2001; Burton and Beckman, 2007; Beckman and Burton, 2008). Thus, the question of what 
determines the formal structure of new enterprises appears to be an important one, and it is one 
that institutional theory is apt to be particularly useful in addressing. 
Sources of Taken-for-Granted Organizational Design 
Existing studies of the form taken by entrepreneurial firms provide evidence of the way in 
which the structure of new ventures reflects institutionalization processes, although scholars do 
not always explicitly recognize the affinity of their arguments with this general theoretic 
approach. Thus, for example, based on surveys and interviews with founders of over 170 start-up 
computer firms in northern California in the mid-1990s, research undertaken as part of the 
Stanford Project on Entrepreneurial Companies (SPEC) defined a number of distinctive 
“blueprints” (or archetypes, in Greenwood and Hinings’s [1988] terminology), based on 
particular combination of compensation, control and staffing practices (Baron, Burton and 
Hannan, 1999). These included “engineering,” “star,” “bureaucracy,” and “commitment,” each 
type reflecting founders’ conceptions of effective organizational form. Research suggests a 
number of different potential sources of these structural prescriptions, including both established 
firms with which new firm founders were previously affiliated (Burton and Beckman, 2008) as 
well as organizations formed specifically to advise and support fledging businesses (Hiatt, 2010; 
Hiatt and Sine, 2008; David and Strang, 2006). 
Previous experiences as organizational employees can strongly shape entrepreneurs’ 
perceptions of how to design their own organization, by providing templates that they often 
follow quite closely (Burton and Beckman, 2007). Sorensen’s (2007) finding that smaller and 
younger firms are more likely to serve as incubators for entrepreneurs than older and larger ones 
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is readily interpretable in this context. Because the processes and routines in younger, smaller 
firms are more readily generalized by former employees to start-up firms than those of larger, 
more established, more bureaucratic organizations, employees from the former types of firms are 
likely to have more confidence in their knowledge of how to start their own enterprise, and feel 
enabled to become entrepreneurs. Thus, the formal structure of existing firms is often transmitted 
to new enterprises via founders’ experiences with those firms (Phillips, 2002). 
However, the formal structure of previous employers is not the only institutional source of 
influence on nascent entrepreneurs’ choices of organizational design. In many industries, 
organizations created to represent the common political interests of organizations in the industry, 
such as trade associations or more specific sets of consortia, also serve as important sources of 
institutionalized models of organizing. One of the common functions of such organization is the 
provision of general informational resources about the industry to the public, and in carrying out 
this function, they often importantly influence entrepreneurs’ understandings of the kinds of 
technologies and structures that are feasible and “best” for firms in this industry. Perhaps 
inadvertently, this may limit the amount of structural variations among new firms. 
In line with this, Sine, Haveman and Tolbert (2005) found that the formation of state 
associations for independent power producers significantly increased the likelihood that new 
firms would be created around more conventional technologies rather than innovative ones. To 
explain this finding, they noted that the leadership of such associations is typically drawn from 
wealthier, more established firms (see Gouldner, 1954). In the independent power sector, such 
firms tended to rely on conventional technologies; hence, consonant with the backgrounds of the 
leaders, the associations fostered environments in which conventional technologies were seen as 
preferable – whether by intent or not. 
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Likewise, research by Hiatt (2010) on new firms in the biodiesel fuel industry found that 
states with a single, dominant association promoting a given type of biodiesel fuel had less 
variation in the types of firms founded than those in which competing associations vied for 
entrepreneurs’ attention. Moreover, he found that in the latter states, new firms were more likely 
to assume innovative forms, ones based on a combination of different technologies, than those in 
states with a single key promoter of a given technology. This is consistent with other work by 
institutional theorists suggesting that the existence of different, competing institutional 
prescriptions can be a source of behavioral innovation, and thus lay the groundwork for the 
emergence of new institutions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
However, it is important to remember that innovation – or deviation from existing 
prescript ions – is not always successful, and indeed, may (often?) have fatal consequences for 
organizations. This leads us to the third question for entrepreneurship research that institutional 
theory may offer a useful framework for studying, the determinants of the survival of new firms. 
Maintaining Organizations: Institutional Influences on Survival 
Although innovativeness is often celebrated as a desirable organizational property by 
entrepreneurship researchers (as noted, this property is sometimes asserted to be a defining 
element of the phenomenon), there are a large number of studies on new firms suggesting that 
enterprises that venture too far from existing institutionalized practices and technologies may 
actually put themselves in jeopardy of failure (Dacin, 1997). That is, even in such a seemingly 
innovation-favoring context as entrepreneurship, conformity with institutional prescriptions can 
be key to the survival of new organizations. The more radically different the product or 
technology of a new organization, the longer customers are likely to take to recognize its utility 
and the greater the likelihood that the organization will fail before such recognition occurs. 
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Likewise, new organizations, even those based on established technologies and products, rarely 
if ever possess the social capital (experience-based trust of suppliers and customers) to allow 
them to vary significantly from institutionalized patterns organizational design. However, 
entrepreneurs may be able to address problems associated with resistance to innovation and 
limited social capital in part by strategically adhering to some institutional prescriptions even 
while straying from others, and by making alliances with actors that have credibility in an 
accepted institutional order. A number of studies provide empirical support for these arguments. 
Institutions and the Creation of New Markets 
Although one line of work on entrepreneurship rests on the explicit assumption that market 
opportunities exist, unseen, prior to their discovery by especially sharp-eyed and sharp-witted 
entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1973; Shane and Venkataram, 2000), extant work suggests that such 
opportunities are created rather than “discovered,” and that those involving new markets, in 
particular, take a great deal of creative effort indeed. The engaging description of Edison’s work 
to gain the public’s acceptance of his technological innovation, electric lighting, provided by 
Hargadon and Dougless (2001) illustrates this well. Their catalog of Edison’s efforts to persuade 
consumers to replace established gas lighting with electric includes high-profile demonstrations 
of the new technology’s potential, such as illuminating the boardroom at the elite financial 
company of Drexel, Morgan and Co., and design decisions to make early electric lights to look 
like gas lamps, complete with flame-shaped light bulbs. At every step, Edison consciously 
sought to build the new market for electricity with the support of and in line with key existing 
institut ions. They suggest his strategies indicate recognition that (2001: 478), 
Without invoking existing understandings, innovations may never be understood and 
adopted in the first place. Yet by hewing closely to existing institutions, innovators risk 
losing the valued details, representing the innovation's true novelty, that ultimately change 
those institutions. Success, then, requires entrepreneurs to locate their ideas within the set 
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of understandings and patterns of action that constitute the institutional environment in 
order to gain initial acceptance, yet somehow retain the inherent differences in the new 
technology that ultimately will be needed to change those institutions. 
Efforts to play up the physical similarity of technological innovations to existing products 
and practices provide one reflection of the way in which institutions shape entrepreneurial 
outcomes. Another is provided by work on the financial liabilities firms incur when they fail to 
conform to standard categories or models held by external evaluators. For example, Zuckerman 
(1999) showed that firms with products that do not neatly fall into industrial categories used by 
stock market analysts are often not evaluated, and this lack of attention by analysts leads to lower 
stock values. One would expect this sort of “categorical imperative” – the need to assume an 
organizational form that is widely recognized and accepted – would be particularly important for 
new firms, which often lack the level of capitalization required to support the sort of market 
creation activities in which Edison engaged. 
Institutional Bridges and New Firm Survival 
Although the pressures on entrepreneurs to conform to institutional prescriptions are 
powerful, and despite the fact that entrepreneurs who fail to conform may face even higher-than-
normal risks, we note that a number of studies suggest that existing institutions can also serve as 
resources, resources that entrepreneurs who are pioneering new areas of economic activity may 
especially need. For example, in a study of the advent of nouvelle cuisine, a key innovation in 
the French restaurant industry, Rao, Monin and Durand (2003) note that the success of this 
innovation rested on the involvement of a number of chefs with high status, well-established 
reputations, who provided a connection between existing gastronomical traditions and the new 
approach. One implication of this finding is that ties to existing actors who have credibility and 
thus can provide legitimacy by proximity may serve as an institutional bridge for entrepreneurs, 
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a strategy that may be useful to all entrepreneurs, but may be particularly useful for those in new 
industries or areas of economic activity (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998). 
Research on daycare centers by Baum and Oliver (1992) provided some early evidence of 
the effects of ties to established actors on firms’ survival. Their analysis demonstrated that 
centers with collaborative agreements with the provincial government or existing community-
based organizations had significantly lower rates of failure than other childcare centers that 
lacked such ties. A variety of resource-exchange mechanisms through which ties affect survival 
rates have been identified in subsequent studies (see Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997), but a 
recent study by Sine, David and Mitsuhashi (2007) underscores the importance of non-material, 
legitimating effects. This research examined the efforts by entrepreneurs in the developing 
independent power sector to get a government agency that was responsible for reviewing 
entrepreneurs’ proposed plans to build power-producing organizations to create an “official 
commission certification.” The agency initially resisted on the grounds that information on the 
agency’s responses to plans (i.e., information on a firm’s qualifying status) was easily available 
through other means and that such a certification was both redundant and meaningless. However, 
the entrepreneurs persevered and the agency ultimately gave way to their pressure and created an 
official certificate. Strikingly, the researchers found that, despite limited informational value and 
lack of any attached resources, certification significantly enhanced firms’ chances of moving 
from planning to operating phase. Their study thus provides strong evidence that signs of 
acceptance by institut ionally-recognized actors can serve to enhance the survival chances of new 
organizations, independent of any actual material benefits provided. It recalls the apocryphal 
tale of Baron de Rothschild who, in response to a petitioner’s request for a loan reputedly replied 
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(Cialdini, 1989: 45), "I won't give you a loan myself; but I will walk arm-in-arm with you across 
the floor of the [London] Stock Exchange, and you soon shall have willing lenders to spare." 
How Institutions Shape Entrepreneurial Enterprises: An Illustration 
To provide more concrete illustrations of some of the points from the preceding 
theoretical discussion, in this section, we describe the historical emergence and contemporary 
organizational dimensions of a relatively new area of entrepreneurial activity, hedge funds. 
Hedge funds represent a form of financial investment organization that took root among U.S. 
investors around the mid-1960s, and gradually spread internationally. Although of comparatively 
recent origin, these organizations have proliferated in the last two decades, and have played a 
key role (sometimes a nearly-devastating one) in many national economies. They provide a 
particularly interesting context for considering the effects of institutional forces on 
entrepreneurship because they have been, to this point, explicitly exempted from the purview of 
state regulation that has dominated most financial organizations since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. Hence, institutional pressures in this case have operated almost entirely through 
informal influences on entrepreneurs’ decision-making rather than through the actions of any 
formal regulatory bodies. We begin by exploring the historical circumstances that led to the 
creation and recent proliferation of these organizations,2 then turn to consider forces that shaped 
their structure and operation, and continue to do so today. 
Field Origins and Early Entrepreneurs 
As suggested above, one of the defining features – perhaps the defining feature (see 
Hildebrand, 2007) – of hedge fund organizations is that they are largely shielded from the 
influence of regulatory institutions (e.g., the Securities Exchange Commission) that shape the 
majority of investing organizations today. These regulatory institutions were established by a 
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succession of laws passed in the wake of the financial crises of the 1930s which were intended to 
prevent the sort of fraud and frenzied speculation that powered the crises. Fundamental aspects 
of these institutions include requirements for mandatory disclosure of information to the public 
on organizational arrangements and investment activity, and restrictions on highly risky activities 
by investment firms. Hedge funds were made possible by regulatory loopholes (sometimes more 
positively referred to as “safe harbor provisions”) which were designed to free very wealthy 
investors from these institutional requirements and restrictions, particularly in cases where 
investors were engaged in making private investments for their own family and close associates. 
As one of the engineers of the loopholes framed the issue (see Miller, 2009: 27), 
You have the situation where there are personal holding companies. A family may have a 
substantial estate and has invested its money in marketable securities. In essence that is a 
private investment company, is it not? We do not want any part of it [proposed SEC 
regulation]; and so we have said that even though you engage in the same type of activity 
as an investment company…if you have less than 100 security holders, you are not a 
public investment company and not within the purview of this legislation. 
Based upon these arguments and heavy lobbying by regulatory opponents, investment 
groups with fewer than 100 members (each of whom could demonstrate that they met relatively 
stringent personal wealth requirements) that did not offer investment opportunities to the general 
public were exempted from the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the 
Investment Advisers Act, passed the same year. 
This laid the legal groundwork – or more precisely, ensured the absence of regulatory 
constraints – that enabled the emergence of a new form of investment organization that came to 
be labeled as a “hedge fund,” although this form did not become a recognized cultural entity for 
nearly two decades. It was the publication of an article in the mid-1960s in Fortune (Loomis, 
1966) on an investment manager named Alfred Jones that effectively led to this recognition. 
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Jones started out as a Ph.D. student in Columbia University’s sociology program, where 
he completed a dissertation in 1938 on differences among social classes in perceiving a 
distinction between individual and organizational property rights. Evidence suggests that while at 
Columbia, Jones became acquainted with Benjamin Graham, a professor in the business school 
at the University, who taught classes on statistics and who produced classic work on securities 
evaluation (Miller, 2009: 34). In later years, Jones became a financial writer for such magazines 
and Time and Fortune. 
Based partly on his research in this role, in 1949, he and four friends formed a private 
investing company, A.W. Jones & Company, in line with the recently established regulatory 
requirements - i.e., less than 100 investors, each possessing very sizeable assets and contributing 
a substantial initial investment. The firm relied on a particular investment strategy known as 
“hedging,” involving leveraging investment capital, and purchasing stocks expected to fall in 
value (for short selling) as well as those expected to increase in value. Its structure was similar in 
key ways to that of a number of pre-Depression investment firms, including the one founded by 
Benjamin Graham, the professor who was at Columbia University with Jones. Like the earlier 
firms, the structure of Jones’s firm provided the general partner (fund manager) with a very high 
level of flexibility, in part by restricting investors’ ability to withdraw their funds at will; there 
was an initial one year lock-in for initial investments, and other restrictions on withdrawals after 
this period. It also entailed a particular, incentive-oriented compensation arrangement, in which 
the manager received two percent of the fund’s total annual investment value, plus 20 percent of 
the fund’s increased value due to investment decisions. 
This organization operated largely unnoticed until Loomis’ (1966) article describing 
hedge fund organizations, exemplified by Jones’ investment strategy and management structure, 
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and highlighting his impressive financial track record, was published. Two years prior to the 
publication of this article, two of Jones’s original associates had left to form their own 
organizations, respectively, City Associates and Fairfield Partners, each based essentially the 
same structural configuration as A.W. Jones. In 1966, two other Wall Street brokers who had 
done business with Jones also decided to start their own hedge fund (Loomis, 1966). Thus, 
evidence suggests that the form had begun to spread primarily through Jones’s network, but after 
the publication of the Fortune article the number of organizations denoted as hedge funds grew 
rapidly, with nearly 200 being founded between 1966 and 1974. It appears that most of these 
closely modeled the form of A.W. Jones & Company, as described by Loomis – same 
compensation structure for managers, similar restrictions for investors’ withdrawal of funds 
(Miller, 2009: 40) – although over time some began to experiment with riskier investment 
strategies. Market declines in the 1970s led to the demise of many hedge fund organizations, but 
market recovery and the publication of another article in the mid-1980s on these organizations in 
Institutional Investor (Rohrer, 1986) led to renewed growth. 
Contemporary Hedge Funds 
The number of hedge fund organizations worldwide at the end of 2008 was estimated at 
10,000, though because these organizations are not subject to reporting requirements, this 
number cannot be validated (IFSL, 2009). However, there are a number of directories of hedge 
fund organizations that provide general information on many funds. To investigate the typical 
organizational features of contemporary funds, we collected annual data from one such directory, 
HedgeWorld's Hedge Fund Directory, for the period 2000-2005. These directories contain data 
on a selection of funds with the largest assets, taken from each of the main investment categories 
listed in the TASS hedge fund database. The TASS database is one of five available hedge fund 
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databases and, in 2005, included over 3800 active hedge funds with over $800 billion in assets. 
The HedgeWorld Directory provided a variety of information on each listed hedge fund 
organization, including the size of the fund in dollars (assets); names of fund managers and fund 
location; a number of performance measures; incentive and management fee structure; 
investment strategies; redemption frequency and notice periods; and the fund’s inception date. 
To illustrate some of the theoretical points in the preceding discussion, we offer some descriptive 
statistics taken from the 650 organizations that were included in the 2005 directory. 
One of the most striking aspects of contemporary hedge fund organizations, evidenced by 
these data, is the high degree of structural similarity among them; the great majority still strongly 
resemble the form of the firm founded by A.W. Jones in the late 1940s, and that by Benjamin 
Graham in the pre-Depression years (which appears to have served as a model for Jones). For 
example, many hedge fund founders followed the compensation structure established in 
Graham’s and Jones’s firms, involving (respectively) a “1 and 20” or “2 and 20” fee. This 
provides managers with a base compensation equal to one or two percent of the fund’s total 
value, and performance compensation of twenty percent of the increased value gained through 
investments (see tables 1 and 2). As shown in table 1, over 52 percent of contemporary hedge 
funds have adopted either a one or two percent management fee structure, with an additional 30 
percent of the firms taking the middle ground, charging a fee of one and a half percent. Only 14 
percent of the firms deviated from these three choices. 
Moreover, as shown in table 2, approximately two-thirds of the firms offer managers a 
20-percent incentive fee, thus exhibiting a remarkable degree of consistency on this structural 
element. Note that these arrangements are not required by any sort of regulatory requirements; 
they appear to be have been adopted by some firms, like Graham’s, in the pre-Depression years, 
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subsequently imitated by Jones’s firm, and have been followed by entrepreneurs founding hedge 
funds ever since. Likewise, the majority of hedge funds have a lock-up period of at least a year 
from the time an investor first invests before he or she can begin redeeming money; this reflects 
Graham’s philosophy of giving the hedge fund manager sufficient time and flexibility to earn a 
return. Again, this lock-up period is not mandated by any regulatory agency, but rather appears 
to reflect the institutional transmission to contemporary entrepreneurs of a model adopted early 
in the industry’s growth. 
The investment strategy referred to as “hedging,” pioneered by Graham and Jones, is still 
the most popular strategy used by hedge funds, with over 40 percent of funds making it their key 
approach (see table 3). However, there has been some notable variation in this organizational 
aspect over time. In the early 1980s, a number of hedge fund managers began experimenting 
with investment policies that represented a significant departure from Jones’ strategy of 
leveraging long-term growth and hedging short term stock. One firm that became well-known for 
its novel inve stment strategy was Julian Robertson’s Tiger Fund, which focused on aggressive 
and market-directional investments using newly-created, over-the-counter derivatives and 
options particularly in the domains of currencies, commodities, and interest rates. In one quarter, 
the fund made over $14 million by shorting the dollar against European currencies (Rohrer, 
1986). In the face of this remarkable performance, an increasing number of hedge fund managers 
began to adopt Robertson’s risky market-direction approach to investing. One such adopter was 
George Soros, who in 1990, sold short the United Kingdom’s sterling pound, requiring the 
government to spend 27 billion pounds to keep the sterling within the currency trading bands 
created by the new European Rate Market (ERM). In a commentary with The Times, Soros 
commented: “We must have been the biggest single factor in the market in the days before the 
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ERM fell apart. Our total position by Black Wednesday had to be worth almost $10 billion. We 
planned to sell more than that. In fact, when Norman Lamont [Chancellor of the Exchequer] said 
just before the devaluation that he would borrow nearly $15 billion to defend the sterling, we 
were amused because that was about how much we wanted to sell” (Kaletsky, 1992). 
The apparent success of these strategies helped gain acceptance for them, despite their 
marked deviation from the strategy that first gave these organizations their name. As shown in 
table 3, while the majority of firms (40%) do still hold to the original strategy of equity hedging, 
the second largest category of investment strategies today is the high-leveraged, market-
directional approach popularized by Robertson and Soros (31%). Given the amount of media 
attention directed to the successes of the latter, this fairly widespread change among hedge fund 
organizations may be less remarkable than the persistence of many funds in pursuing the 
traditiona l equ it y strategy. 
Summary 
This brief history illustrates a number of our main points about the importance of 
examining institutions in research on entrepreneurial phenomena. First, it instantiates our 
arguments about the importance of cognitive templates of organization for enabling 
entrepreneurial activity. The pattern of the very earliest hedge fund foundings maps closely on to 
personal connections between would-be entrepreneurs and individuals with some experience in 
this new area – from Graham to Jones, and from Jones to several of his associates. However, this 
slow process of individual transmission was speeded up considerably by a prominently-placed 
publication, giving dispersed individuals relevant knowledge of how to organize in this area, 
even in the absence of personal ties to prior entrepreneurs, and providing normative validation 
for organizing efforts. The growth of mutual funds and other forms of investment organization 
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during this period also probably provided a normative halo for these firms, even though they 
were outside the “appropriately regulated” sphere. 
In addition, the pronounced effects of institutionalized structures on the forms taken by 
new ventures are clearly evidenced in the data on current firms. The degree of homogeneity 
among contemporary hedge fund organizations on a variety of dimensions of structure, including 
compe nsation systems and transaction rules, is qu ite striking, especially since (as we keep 
pointing out) there are no formal regulations to drive such similarity. Variation in investment 
strategies represents one interesting point of deviation from older, established practices. Our 
sense is that media coverage played an important role allowing and encouraging firms to 
innovate on this dimension, by not only publicizing but often implicitly valorizing such 
deviations. In this context, the fact that many firms continue to hew to the hedging strategy 
adopted by Jones and touted in Loomis’s early article may be as noteworthy as the changes in 
some funds’ strategy. 
There have been a number of periods of rapid growth and subsequent large-scale failures 
in the hedge fund industry (e.g., between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, and again between the 
1980s and the late 1990s). Unfortunately, because this is an unregulated area, historical records 
of organizations in this industry are difficult to come by, and the data we have do not provide 
even a glimpse of differences between failing and surviving firms. We speculate that those funds 
that adhered more closely to the institutionalized form were more likely to be in the latter 
category, but that speculation will have to await verification. 
Conclusions: Directions for Future Research 
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The adoption of an institutional perspective on issues of entrepreneurship suggests a wide 
variety of issues that merit further attention by researchers. Below, we consider just a few of a 
lengthy catalog of possible questions for study. 
1. An issue that we find particularly intriguing is: What determines the emergence and 
maintenance of entrepreneurship as an institution? This is an issue that many policy makers 
would most likely find of interest as well, since it might help understand when “enterprise zones” 
or other efforts to foster new business start-ups are likely to be effective. As we suggested at the 
outset, we do not view institutional theory as particularly well-suited to explaining where 
institut ions come from or conditions under which they’re likely to emerge (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1996); rather, its focus is on explaining the consequences of institutions for organizations. 
Hence, different lines of work and theoretical perspectives are likely to be needed to explain how 
and when entrepreneurship is apt to become institutionalized within a group. 
Work on ethnic entrepreneurship offer some important insights into this problem, 
suggesting a number of group characteristics that encourage and facilitate entrepreneurial 
activities. One is the presence of dense social networks or patterns of frequent interaction among 
group members (Light and Rosenstein, 1995; Light and Gold, 2000). Dense networks support 
entrepreneurship for a number of reasons. Perhaps most obviously, frequent interactions can 
facilitate flows of information among other members about potential entrepreneurial 
opportunities, along with the tacit “how-tos” required to take advantage of those opportunities 
(Anderson and Jack, 2002). Dense networks also are indicators of the sort of group solidarity that 
makes possible and encourages sharing of resources, especially important to entrepreneurial 
activity among groups whose members generally have few resources; pooling resources may be 
the only means through which entrepreneurship can become “seeded” under such circumstances 
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(Light, 1972). The formation of dense networks, in turn, have been linked to strong in-group 
identification, often associated with ethnic group membership (Light, 1972; Light and 
Rosenstein, 1995). It’s worth noting, however, that occupational membership can also serve this 
function (Barley and Kunda, 2004; Tolbert, 1996), at least under some circumstances. Hence, 
occupational enclaves (like that of computer technicians and scientists in Silicon Valley) may 
also provide conditions that facilitate the institutionalization of entrepreneurship. 
These characteristics may provide fertile ground for the seeding of entrepreneurship as an 
institution, but it’s not clear that they are subject to social intervention, a problem of concern to 
policy makers interested in encouraging entrepreneurship (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006). Thus, 
from the latter standpoint, one important avenue for future research is identification of other 
characteristics of social groups that may similarly encourage the development of entrepreneurial 
institutions, and mechanisms for cultivating these. Can these be produced through educational 
efforts, ones that promote entrepreneurship as a career option and that explicitly teach 
individuals about the role of network connections in this respect? Are there other organizations, 
such as trade associations or local political organizations, that might also be effectively 
harnessed? 
2. A second question that is suggested by taking an institutional theoretic approach to 
understanding entrepreneurship is: What factors determine and maintain structural variation 
among newly founded firms? Given the existing work on the effects of previous employment 
experiences on entrepreneurs’ decisions about how to organize their new enterprises, one might 
expect that the more varied the backgrounds of founders (in terms of industry of previous 
employment or previous occupations), the greater the diversity in the forms that new firms take 
(Burton, Sorenson and Beckman, 2007; Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert, 2009). However, work that has 
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examined the impact of organizations specifically formed to encourage and facilitate the entry of 
new firms into an industry (Hiatt, 2010; Sine, Haveman and Tolbert, 2005) also suggests that 
these organizations are apt to dampen the effect of such variability, and produce increased 
homogeneity among new firms. Understanding the persistence of variation in the sorts of 
templates entrepreneurs bring with them, as well as the forces that mitigate such influences and 
thus smooth variations in form are important questions for understanding forces that shape 
entrepreneurial activity and outcomes in different phases of industrial life-cycles. 
3. Finally, our analysis suggests that understanding the effects of institutional conformity on 
firm survival is a particularly pertinent question for entrepreneurship researchers. As noted, the 
emphasis in the entrepreneurship literature on creativity and innovation neglects the questions of 
how firms can gain general recognition and acceptance of creative and innovative products and 
processes. Inertia is not just a property of organizations; that is, this organizational property is 
rooted in very fundamental human preferences for stability, and variety only within fairly narrow 
limits (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). Thus, the processes and mechanisms involved in gaining 
public acceptance of truly innovative or creative outputs and practices by entrepreneurs warrants 
much more attention by scholars. In our discussion of hedge fund organizations, we speculated 
that, rather ironically, conformit y to inst itutiona l prescript ions (suc h as exist) might be 
particularly crucial to organizations in new sectors because the level of uncertainty 
characterizing the agents an organization transacts with about the sector could be offset, in part, 
by new organizations’ efforts to signal their reliability through institutional conformity. 
However, this suggestion has to await empirical evidence. 
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Overall, then, we think that the use of an institutional perspective in examining 
entrepreneurship offers the opportunity both to consider and explore a variety of issues that are 
important to understanding entrepreneurship, and to expand institutional theory as well. 
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End Notes 
1
 Tolbert and Zucker (1996) challenged Meyer and Rowan’s arguments about decoupling, 
suggesting that these were logically inconsistent with other parts of their discussion. However, 
the concept of decoupling does make sense if adoption of structures is based on normative 
conformity, rather than informational conformity, a distinction of long-standing in the small 
groups literature on conformity (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). In this analysis, our view of 
institutional theory reflects a more phenomenological approach, which gives greater weight to 
informational conformity as the underlying psychological mechanism in organizational decision-
making and organizational outcomes (see Tolbert, 2010). 
2
 This account relies heavily on the careful and thoughtful analysis of institutional entrepreneurs 
in creating the conditions for the rise of hedge funds by Justin Miller (2009). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Distribution of Management Fee 
Arrangements among Hedge Fund 
Organizations, 2005 
Percent of Firms 
One Percent 40 
One and half percent 30 
Two Percent 12 
Other 14 
Table 2: Distribution of Incentive Fee 
Arrangements among Hedge Fund 
Organizations, 2005 
Percent of Firms 
Twenty percent 65 
Ten percent 11 
Other 24 
Table 3: Distribution of Investment Strategies 
among Hedge Fund Organizations, 2005 
Percent of Firms 
Traditional equity hedging 40 
Directional bets 31 
Fund of funds 23 
Other 6 
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